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THE PRIVILEGE OF FORCIBLY EJECTING AN
AMUSEMENT PATRON *
ALFRED F. CONARD t
An amusement proprietor may, in the midst of an entertainment,
order a paying patron to leave, and eject him with force if he refuses.
Notwithstanding a minority opinion to the contrary, this is text book
law. 1  It is also encyclopedia law 2 and law school law.3  Is it law in
action?
THE DOCTRINE QUESTIONED
There are reasons for suspecting that the supposed rule is not
actually applied 'to current cases. Common sense asks what theater
proprietor is going to toss out his paying patrons. It is conceivable,
to be sure, that he may put out those who violate the regulations of
his theater by being Negroes,4 or by creating disturbances, or by
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1. 3 Tn 'ANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 409, n. 45. See also BURDICK, REAL
PROPERTY (1914) 405; WALSH, PROP'ERTY (2d ed. 1927) 701. But the contrary rule is
stated in TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (Zollman's abr. ed. 1940) 525.
2. 62 C. J. (1933) 861; 26 R. C. L. (i9o) 7o4, stating that "the only remedy . . .
is an action for breach of the contract." The statement on the following page that
"one holding a ticket of admission . . . is entitled to a seat" is consistent if under-
stood to refer to rights enforceable by an action for breach of contract.
3. Leading casebooks on Property Law, though generally printing decisions illus-
trative of the contrary view, indicate the weight of authority to be as herein stated.
Thus, BIGELOW AND MADDEN, CASES ON RIGHTS IN LAND (2d ed. 1934) contains Wood
v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 351 (Ex. 1845) (accord); Hurst v.
Picture Theatres, [19151 I K. B. I (contra) ; Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 246 Ky.
130, 54 S. W. (2d) 62o (1932) (accord) ; and notes pro and con. RUNDEL, CASES ON
RIGHTS IN LAND (94I) sets forth Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374, 129 Eng. Rep. R.
i5o (C. P. 1816) (contra); Wood v. Leadbitter, supra (accord) ; Cowell v. The Rose-
hill Racecourse Co., 56 C. L. R. 6o5 (Australia, 1937) (accord) ; Marrone v. Wash-
ington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633 (1913) (accord) ; and notes referring to Hurst v.
Picture Theatres, supra (contra) and to the dissenting opinion in the Cowell case,
supra. WARREN, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1938) presents Wood v. Leadbitter, s=pra
(accord) ; Hurst v. Picture Theatres, supra (contra); and adds a note favoring the
former.
Law Review notes favoring the dogma are in (iM) 42 HARv. L. REv. 834; (1914)
27 H v. L. RV. 495; (1901) 14 HAtRV. L. REV. 455; 0937) 53 L. Q. REV. 318; (1915)
31 L. REv. 217; (1941) 4o MicH. L. REv. 324. Notes recognizing but not wholly
favoring the dogma are in (1915) 63 U. oF PA. L. REv. 223; (1914) 14 COL. L. REV.
6o; (1915) 31 L. Q. REV. 9; (915) 13 MIcr. L. REv. 4O; (1938) 5 U. OF CHL L.
REv. 301.
4. Such a regulaton would be invalid in a jurisdiction having a "Civil Rights
Law" such as those cited note 74 infra.
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sitting in the wrong seats. In such instances, he is merely expelling
one whose presence is not in accordance with the contract of admittance,
but in violation of it; and he should not be liable even to return the
price of admission. It is also conceivable that ushers will make mis-
takes, reasonable and unreasonable; as to these it would be necessary
only to recognize reasonable mistake, and perhaps good faith, as
grounds of defense. But the doctrine goes further; it permits the
proprietor to act "for a bad reason or no reason at all." 5 Common
sense asks whether proprietors actually put out customers in violation
of contract, and without even an honest belief of facts which would
constitute good cause.
A second reason for doubting the genuineness of the doctrine
inheres in the classic argument which is invoked to support it. The
customer has no right againsL being expelled, it is explained, because
that would be a right in land, which can only be given by deed.6 The
customer has no deed. Evidently the customer would have a right if
he had a deed! Common sense steps in again to say that this is mere
verbiage. No one ever did, nor ever will, have a deed to a theater,
seat; to say that one who has no deed has no right is a misleading way
of saying no one has a right. Professor Summers of Illinois used to
dramatize this aspect of the problem by asking his students whether
you need a deed to see a movie.
A third reason for doubting the actuality of the rule is the shock
which it gives to many people's sense of justice. I cannot escape the
feeling that an amusement patron who is put out of his seat has been
abused in the same sense that a citizen who is driven off the street has
been abused, and that the same remedies should be available to him.
Evidently some judges feel very similarly. The first cases held for
the patron in England,7 New York," Quebec,9 Pennsylvania 10 and
Washington.11 Most of these decisions gave way to the logic of the
argument that the plaintiff should show a deed for his right, or at least
an intention to acquire a right "in rem". 12  But the English courts
5. (915) 13 MicH. L. REV. 401, 403. See also Gorman v. United Theatres, 77
So. 463 (La. Ct. App. 1937).
6. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633 (913) ; Wood v. Leadbit-
ter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 351 (Ex. 1845). In the former case Mr.
Justice Holmes suggested the additional reason that the parties do not ordinarily intend
to create a right in rem.
7. Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374, 129 Eng. Rep. R. 150 (C. P. 1816).
8. Magoverning v. Staples, 7 Lans. 145 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873); MacGowan v.
Duff, 14 Daly 315, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 68o (N. Y. C. P. 1887) ; Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun
242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1895).
9. Sparrow v. Johnson, 8 Quebec Official L. Rep. 379 (Q. B. 1899).
io. Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234 (1880).
ii. Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
12. Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 2o, 61 Ati. io88 (19o5) ; Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball
Club, 122 Wash. 276, 21o Pac. 679 (1922) ; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153
Eng. Rep. R. 351 (Ex. 1845).
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later reverted to their original opinion,13 and at least two American
courts have in recent years shown a leaning toward the patron's side.' 4
Mr. Justice Herbert Vere Evatt of the Australian Supreme Court,
whose liberal views and keen observations have made him known to
American readers, has dissented in favor of the patron. 15 Two Amer-
ican writers on rights in land and various law review editors have
expressed their doubts about the prevailing dogma.:6 Such differences
of opinion about the equities in a factual situation may rest on a mis-
conception in some quarter of what the facts are.
One more suspicious circumstance about the rule is the astuteness
with which courts find means of awarding damages in spite of it. In
Plnchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theater Co.,1 7 an usher
who thought the plaintiff had opened a window said, "So it was you,
you smart Aleck; I will have you put out; and I will slap your face,"
and had the plaintiff led out by a police officer. The police officer said,
"If you do not behave, I will put you out," to which the plaintiff re-
plied, "You are not big enough." 's Without casting any doubt on the
Tule that a ticket holder's license is revocable, the court allowed re-
covery of $500 (reduced from a verdict of $2000) for insult and
maltreatment. Similar results have followed "incivility" in at least
four other states where the doctrine is not challenged,19 as well as in
two states where the doctrine is doubted but not yet rejected.20 Here
ds either a new tort of insult,2 ' or a practical evasion of the rule that
an amusement patron's license is revocable. The rule may also be
13. Hurst v. Picture Theatres, 11915] 1 K. B. i; accord, Barnswell v. National
Amusement Co., 2r Brit. Col. 435, 23 D. L. R. 615 (Brit. Col. App. 1915).
14. Bouknight v. Lester, 119 S. C. 466, 112 S. E. 274 (192) ; Metts v. Charleston
Theater, io5 S. C. ig, 89 S. E. 389 (I916) ; Kelly v. Dent Theaters, 21 S. W. (2d) 592
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929), (193o) 8 TEX. L. REv. 6ox.
15. Evatt, J., dissenting, in Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse, 56 C. L. R. 6o5, 640
(Australia, 1937), 53 L. Q. REV. 318. American publications of Mr. Justice Evatt in-
clude Judges and the Teachers of Public Law (1940) 53 HAv. L. REV. 1145; Control
of Labor Relations in the Commonwealtk of Aistrald (I939) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv.
529; Some Legal Aspects of Indiutrial Arbitration in; the Comnwiowealth of Australia
(I939) 3 AIB. J. 365. Since this article was written, Mr. Justice Evatt has broken into
the head lines as Minister of External Affairs.
i6. Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law (192i) 21 CoT. L. REV. 757,
778-79, reprinted in REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "Rux WITrH
LAND" (ig) 8, 43-44; Harno, The Revocability of Licenses as Applied to Property
in Land (1919) 7 Ky. L. J. I; (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REV. 223; (1914) 14 Co. L.
REV. 6o8; (1915) 31 L. Q. REV. 9; (I915) 13 MICH. L. REV. 4oi; (1938) 5 U. OF Ci.
L. REV. 3o.
17. I66 La. 235, 117 So. 132 (1928).
18. Id. at 238, 239, 117 So. at 133.
ig. Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, Ii9 S. W. 195 (Ky. i9og); Saenger Theatres
Corp. v. Herndon, 178 So. 86 (Miss. 1938); Ayres v. Middleton Theater Co., 2io S.
W. 911 (Mo. App. i919); Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, I85 S. W. 692
(1916).
20. See cases cited note 14 supra.
21. This is the view of Professor Prosser, who regards these cases as illustrations
of tort liability for causing "mental disturbance." PRossE, TORTS (1941) 59-6o. The
Restatement announces liability for insult only on the part of common carriers, with a
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evaded, while lip service is paid to it, in at least three other ways. One
may say that damages for breach of the contract are not confined to
the price, but include humiliation; 22 or that, though the license be
revocable, no force may be used in expelling the patron; 23 or that,
though the license be revocable, it is not revocable without reasonable
cause.
2 4
FACTUAL SITUATIONS DISCLOSED BY THE CASES
The suggestion that this respected dogma is not actually used in
deciding cases may be regarded by some readers as an impertinence.
Readers of this mind will say that if the rule were not "law in action"
it would never have become "law in books." Under the common law
system, books record the actual decisions of actual controversies. The
judge decides nothing that is not presented by the facts of the case;
if his words exceed the warrant of his facts, they are disregarded as
obiter dicta.
For such a reader, one can only appeal to the cases themselves.
In two annotations of the American Lawyer's Reports, a total of
twenty-one cases are cited in support of the general rule. None of
these cases discloses a set of facts requiring the statement of the rule
in its usual form. In four of them, the plaintiff was notified before
he obtained a ticket that he would not be admitted, so that he never
obtained any valid agreement of admittance; if he bought a ticket, it
was with knowledge that its sale to him was unauthorized. 25 In three
of these cases, the plaintiff was stopped at the door without reaching
a seat.2
6
caveat as to other public utilities, and amusement proprietors. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(934) §48.
22. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1911). This theory is favored
by Clark, loc. cit. supra note 16. But see Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29
R. .23, 68 Atl. 721 (19o8).
23. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (Servitudes Div., Tent. Draft No. 12, 1939) § 66,
comment b; Note (1941) 40 Mica. L. REV. 324, 326.
24. Cummins v. St. Louis Amusement Co., 147 S. W. (2d) i9o (Mo. App. i94i).
This formula obviously deprives "revocable" of most of its ordinary meaning, as pointed
out in a comment on this case (1941) 40 MicH. L. REv. 324, 325-26.
25. People ex rel. Burnham v. Flynn, i89 N. Y. i8o, 82 N. E. 169 (1907) (peti-
tioner in habeas corpus had been arrested for conspiracy to exclude a critic from
theaters) ; Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, I1 N. E. 829 (1916) (proprietor.re-
fused to admit unfriendly critic); Miller v. Pittsburgh Athletic Ass'n, 91 Pa. Super.
241 (927) (tickets being oversubscribed, proprietor refused to sell to plaintiff) ; Fin-
nesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, 122 Wash. 276, 210 Pac. 679 (1922) (fan had received
official notice of exclusion because of bribing and treating players; nevertheless he ob-
tained a seat, and was expelled). Accord, Pearce v. Spalding, 12 Mo. App. 141 (1882)
(proprietor refused to sell plaintiff seats of his selection) ; People on complaint of
Zvirin v. Roxy Theatre, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 92 (N. Y. City Magistrate's Ct. 1938) (re-
fusal to sell seats at advertised price) ; Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153
N. Y. 449, 47 N. E. 896 (1897) (plaintiff had been "ruled off the turf" for bribing a
jockey).
26. In People v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. i8o, 185, 82 N. E. i69, 171 (IO7), the question was
stated by the court as "whether the proprietor . . . has the right to decide who shall
be admitted. . . ." (Italics supplied.) In Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 216,
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A group of seven cases deals with patrons who were admittedly
violating the regulations which the proprietor had established. Three
of these patrons were Negroes; 27 a fourth was disqualified by a regu-
lation against service men in uniform; 28 others had tickets which were
invalid for the night when used,2 9 or for the seats the patron was
occupying,30 or because of having been resold in violation of their
terms.
3 1
In four other cases the proprietors evidently would not have sold
tickets to the patrons, had they known with whom they were dealing,
and the patrons probably knew it. But these facts were not litigated,
because the judges held to the theory that the reasons for expulsion
are immaterial. I am not, of course, contending that the cases are not
authority for that theory. I am discussing the factual situations from
which expulsion cases arise. From this point of view, it seems fair
to observe that plaintiff Wood was ejected "in consequence of some
alleged malpractices of his on a former occasion, connected with the
turf ;" 32 that Mr. Marrone was expelled "on the charge of having
'doped' or drugged a horse entered by him for a race a few days
before." 33 Neither of these accusations can be viewed as an after-
thought for bolstering the defense, as each appears to have been made
at the moment of expulsion; the latter accusation was pleaded by the
plaintiff himself in setting forth the defendant's alleged conspiracy.
Both of these cases, which are the preEminent authorities for the doc-
trine, concern horse races, where most persons do not occupy fixed
iii N. E. 829, 830 (ii6), the case was decided on the ground that the proprietor "has
the right to decide who shall be admitted or exchlded." (Italics supplied.) Nothing
in either opinion referred to ejection. In Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, 122 Wash.
276, 279, 21o Pac. 679, 68o, 68r (1922), it was "the contention of appellants that the own-
ers of the ball park . . . are bound by the same rules as a common carrier of passen-
gers . . . or that our civil rights statute was in some way violated. . . ." After
rejecting this contention the court added that a customer may be ejected as well as
excluded.
27. McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. 211 (1858); Burton v. Scherpf, 83 Mass. 133
(186I) ; Taylor v. Cohn, 47 Ore. 538, 84 Pac. 388 (9o6). Accord, Younger v. Judah,
III Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109 (1892); De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres, 82 Utah 598, 26
P. (2d) 818 (933) (Filipino); Loew's Montreal Theatres v. Reynolds, 3o Quebec
Official L. Rep. 459 (K. B. I919). But cf. (under Civil Rights Law) Baylies v. Curry,
128 Ill. 287, 21 N. E. 595 (1899) ; Bolden v. Grand Rapids &c. Corp., 239 Mich. 318,
214 N. W. 241 (927); Cremore v. Huber, 18 App. Div. 231, 45 N. Y. Supp. 947
(897) ; and cf. (where no previous regulation existed) Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234
(i88o); Sparrow v. Johnson, 8 Quebec Official L. Rep. 379 (Q. B. 1899).
28. Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29 R. I. 23, 68 Atl. 721 (19o8).
29. Luxenberg v. Keith & Proctor Amusement Co., 64 Misc. 69, 1I7 N. Y. Supp.
979 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. i9og). Accord, Bouknight v. Lester, 119 S. C. 466, ii2 S. E. 274
(192i). Cf. Schafer v. Tex Rickard, 132 Misc. 489, 229 N. Y. Supp. 471 (N. Y. Mun.
Ct. 1928) (plaintiff arrived after gates had closed for Dempsey-Sharkey fight).
3o. Hyde v. Toronto Theatre, 17 Ont. W. R. 380 (I91o). Accord, Powell v.
Weber-Stair Co., 125 S. W. 255 (Ky. igio).
31. Purcell v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. 301 (N. Y. Dist. Ct. i886). See also Collister
v. Hayman, 183 N. Y. 250, 76 N. E. 2o (19o5) ; Harris v. Jack's Theatre Ticket Serv-
ice, 139 Misc. II, 246 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1930).
32. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 351 (Ex. 1845).
33. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633 (1913).
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seats, but move about, and where by common knowledge large numbers
of detectives are required to deal with the large numbers of malefactors
which are usually present. Somewhat similar is the case of Meisner,
who was refused admittance to an amusement park on the ground that
he had previously caused disturbances. 4
The fourth case of the present group is that in which Lee Shubert,
theatrical producer, was attending a Newark show of his competitor,
Florenz Ziegfeld. 85 Shubert was in a seat and was not misbehaving;
he was ordered to leave, and did so, so far as his pleading reveals,
without any force being applied or threatened. This would seem to
present a pure case of breach of contract, with no tort under any view
of the law,3s but it is commonly treated as an application of the usual
rule. No reason for ejecting him appears from the record, excepting
his name. It is the Shuberts' story that he was expelled because of
personal difficulties over a loan.37 Mr. Ziegfeld is able to tell no tales.
But it is certain that Shubert was then living in New York, where he
owned several shows, as well as others on tour. For years before and
after the Newark incident there raged a trade war between the "inde-
pendents" (the Shuberts) and the "syndicate" (Kaw and Erlanger).
Ziegfeld was backed by Erlanger. The rivalry extended as widely
as the circuits, and it was front page copy. A regular feature of com-
petition in this era was spotting attractive performers of other com-
panies, and making them flattering offers after the show, regardless
of Lumley v. Gye.38 Unless Shubert had travelled to Newark that
evening purely to enjoy Ziegfeld's show, it is doubtful that he really
thought of himself as a welcome guest. Even in a state where the
theater has a duty of public service, its duty is to furnish amusement,
not business opportunities.
89
In four cases it seems likely that the proprietor broke the con-
tract of admittance, not by putting the patron out but by refusing to
seat him; the transaction was still in the executory stage. In one case,
the seats had been erroneously given to some one else,40 in another,
34. Meisner v. Detroit &c. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, ii8 N. W. 14 (igo8).
35. Shubert v. Nixon Co., 83 N. J. L. 1O1, 83 Atl. 369 (1912). Ziegfeld was a co-
defendant.
36. The complaint seems to have been framed on the theory that the Civil Rights
Laws put the amusement proprietors under a duty to serve all comers, a theory which
had been adopted in Greeneberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050
(1903), and which had some influence upon Aaron v. Ward, 2o3 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E.
736 (1911).
37. From an interview of the writer with William Klein, counsel to the Shuberts.
38. See A. J. Liebling, The Boys from Syracuse (a biography of the Shuberts),
Nmv YoRxER, Nov. 25, 1939, pp. 23-25; Eddie Cantor, Ziegfeld aid His Follies, CoL-
IERs, Jan. 13, 20, 27, Feb. 3, 10, 17, 1934; William Lyon Phelps, The New Theafre
(1909) 67 INDEPENDENT 957.
39. Greeneberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903).
40. Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, I85 S. W. 692 (ii6).
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the manager claimed he had no seats.41 It is interesting that in both
of these cases the plaintiffs actually recovered substantial damages, on
the ground of "incivility" and "rudeness" in the manner of their ex-
pulsion. 42 In a third case the proprietor had sold seats which he had
been obliged by municipal officers to eliminate; 43 in a fourth, all that
ippears is the fact of exclusion from a seat, after passing the ticket
taker.
4 4
The two remaining decisions present no relevant fact situation.
In passing on the validity of a statute for licensing ticket brokers, one
of them repeated the usual dogma that a ticket creates only a revocable
license.45 In the other, the proprietor was not sued for assault but
himself brought suit in trespass against a licensee of the previous
owner.
46
If we turn from the cases decided for the proprietor to those in
which the customer obtained judgment, substantial reasons for expul-
sion are equally apparent. The annotations previously referred to cite
eight cases. In two, the patrons were Negroes; but since no regulation
was shown to have been established, the expulsion was held arbitrary.
47
In another, in which substantial damages were allowed apparently on
a contract theory, the patron was admittedly involved in a quarrel with
a neighbor over their respective places in line; 48 apparently the jury
decided that the plaintiff had been right in the quarrel. In two cases,
one of which established the modern English view, the proprietors
mistakenly supposed that the plaintiffs were occupying wrong seats. 49
In another, the patron was in fact attending on a night to which his
ticket did not entitle him, and his right to compensatory damages
slipped by unchallenged in a debate about punitive damages.50 In the
earliest English case, the proprietors who excluded the plaintiff were
41. Ayres v. Middleton Theater Co., 21o S. W. 911 (Mo. App. igi).
42. Compare cases cited notes 14, 17, 19, supra.
43. Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 2o, 6x Atl. io88 (i9o5). "A theater ticket is to be
regarded as a mere license, for the revocation of which, before the holder Ir actially
been give) his seat and has taken it, the only remedy is in assumpsit for breach of con-
tract." Id. at 27, 6i Atl. at io9o. (Italics supplied.)
44. W. W. V. Co. v. Black, 113 Va. 728, 75 S. E. 82 (1912).
45. Opinion of the Justices, 247 Mass. 589, 143 N. E. 8o8 (1924).
46. Coleman v. Foster, i H. & N. 37, i56 Eng. Rep. R. niog (Ex. 1856). Not-
withstanding the numerous dicta that a ticket holder is a trespasser after revocation of
his license, this appears to be the only decision which ever held him liable for trespass;
in this case the licensor's sub-lessee refused (at the entrance) to honor a "season
ticket."
47. Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234 (i88o); Sparrow v. Johnson, 8 Quebec Official L,
Rep. 379 (Q. B. i899).
48. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (gii). Cf. Cummins v. St. Louis
Amusement Co., 147 S. W. (2d) i9o (Mo. App. 1941), where the audience broke into
commotion during a breakdown of the projector, and an usher mistook the 13 year old
plaintiff for a participant.
49. Bounlmight v. Lester, iig S. C. 466, 112 S. E. 274 (i921); Hurst v. Picture
Theatres, [1915] 1 K. B. i.
5o. MacGowan v. Duff, i4 Daly 315, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 68o (N. Y. C. P. 1887).
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assignees of earlier proprietors who had sold the plaintiff his twenty-
one year subscription to a box.51 In only one of the eight cases does
no reason for the expulsion appear, and this involves a dancing school
from whose dance the plaintiff was ejected.52  This recalls the race
course and amusement park cases; the plaintiff has no fixed location
to which he can claim a right, and because he moves from place to place
his mere personality or appearance may make it desirable for the
proprietor to remove him.
It is evident that the, conception of a proprietor arbitrarily ex-
pelling a patron is a legal fiction. Proprietors very rarely expel patrons
who are not violating established rules, or suspected of it, despite their
-legal privilege to do so. On the other hand, proprietors do exclude
patrons on a variety of grounds which are not always reasonable.
It further appears that proprietors' legal privileges both of ex-
clusion and of expulsion are limited by a vague ground of liability
which consists in exercising the privilege of expulsion with an uncivil
tongue. As a result of this doctrine, a proprietor cannot effect an
expulsion without becoming vulnerable to a jury finding against him,
regardless of whether a privilege to expel is or is not ostensibly
recognized.
FACTUAL SITUATIONS DISCLOSED OUTSIDE THE CASES
The cases do not show that arbitrary forcible ejections are an
existing problem. I have therefore inquired of several lawyers and
laymen to see whether experience supplies what the reports do not.
The theater lawyers, naturally enough, denied that any such ejec-
tions occur. I gave their general denial the credence to which such
pleadings are usually entitled, but one of them supplied some convincing
reasons for his statement. He represented a large number of neighbor-
hood cinema theaters in a large city, and observed that his patrons come
to the theater for escape from emotional insecurity. Nothing must go
on which would break in upon the sense of personal security in the the-
ater. Suspicious characters may be stopped in the lobby, but in the
theater proper, no conflicts between management and patron can be
tolerated. If a Negro, who would usually be excluded, reaches a seat,
he is not ousted from it. Even disorderly patrons are not expelled
sunless absolutely necessary. Although drunk this week, they may be
sober next week. If they prove to be habitual offenders, they can be
recognized at the door, and forbidden to enter.
5I. Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374, 129 Eng. Rep. R. i5o (C. P. 1816).
52. Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun 242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 (Sup. Ct. i895).
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One of the lawyers who furnished this account of proprietors'
attitudes was William Klein, who for some thirty years has represented
the Shubert brothers' theater empire. It was ridiculous, he asserted, to
suggest that a management would order or tolerate arbitrary expulsions.
Then I asked him about the case in which Lee Shubert was expelled
from a Ziegfeld show in a Newark theater.53 This, he said after some
thought, was the exception to the rule. Shubert was a bona fide cus-
tomer, seeking entertainment. Ziegfeld disliked him because of a loan
over which they had disagreed. But it was the only exception he had
ever heard of. Moreover, no force was used on Shubert-a fact which
the reported case confirms. Klein says that the management refused
to raise the curtain unless Shubert would leave, which Shubert oblig-
ingly did. "I guess any one would under those circumstances," ob-
served Mr. Klein.
5 4
Was it just as well, really, that Shubert had failed to recover; and
that, if another such instance should occur, no substantial damages
should be recovered? Mr. Klein wouldn't say so.
"If a man is put out of a seat as Shubert was," said Mr. Klein,
"he has a right to be mad. I think he ought to get all the damages he
can."
Other theater lawyers declined to express themselves upon the jus-
tice due to an arbitrarily ejected patron. The case doesn't exist, they
said. I inferred that they felt some difficulty in saying that such a
customer should go without any remedy but a refund.
Theater lawyers are not impartial observers of the scene, but I had
reason to believe that they were frank with me. For example, most of
the New York lawyers admitted that despite the Civil Rights law 55 a
Negro cannot gain admittance to the orchestra floor of their theaters.
One told me that sex perverts who molest female customers are some-
times taken to the alley and beaten up; they are not the type to make a
complaint. 56 They made no secret of the facts, which were confirmed
by a national insurance organization, 57 that liabilities for accidents
caused by defective equipment run into significant figures, while liabili-
ties for expulsions and exclusions of all sorts, including Civil Rights
cases, are financially insignificant.
Other factors led me to believe that the problem of arbitrary ex-
pulsion is practically unknown. Three New York lawyers, in telling
53. Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N. J. L. ioi, 83 Atl. 369 (1912).
54. Alexander Woollcott ("the man who came to dinner") has orally avowed he
would not leave under such circumstances.
55. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) §§ 40, 41.
56. This surprising report was not corroborated by any other informant.
57. The National Board of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, New York City,
through the courtesy of Mr. E. W. Sawyer.
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me what the law is, repeated the dogma that a customer has only a
revocable license, and that his only remedy if expelled is refund of his
admission price. When I reminded them of the Court of Appeals deci-
sion allowing damages of $250 for humiliation caused by breach of
contract, none of them had a clear recollection of the case.58 It is not
important in their practice.
The same fact was impressively demonstrated by my conversation
with the attorney for a large group of legitimate theaters. He told me
that his organization was fully protected by a "revocable license" clause
on the reverse of each ticket 59 I responded that I had seen some of
his tickets which did not have it, although it was usually present on the
tickets of the cinema theaters. He drew some tickets from his desk,
and was startled to find no revocable license clause upon them. The
attorney immediately lifted his phone and called his general manager
for an explanation. After a few moments' conversation he hung up,
and said that they used to print the clause a few years before, but had
given it up to save printing expense. He said he would look into it.
If there were to be any complaints of the actual conduct of theater
managements, it would evidently have to come from outside the theater.
Legal aid lawyers in two cities had never encountered the problem. A
lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union was sure that they had
never had any complaints of persecution by way of ejection from thea-
ters. However, he pointed out that this was not within the scope of
A. C. L. U. activities. Like the fifth and fourteenth amendments, it
is concerned with the acts of governments, not of individuals.
At the Association for the Advancement of Colored People, there
was no lack of complaint about the conduct of theaters. But even here
there was no complaint about arbitrary expulsions. The lawyer with
whom I talked confirmed the theater lawyers' story that Negroes are
stopped at the entrance or not at all. If one obtains a seat, the man-
agement thinks it best to leave him there. This very practice was cited
to show that Negroes do not really interfere with white persons' enjoy-
ment of a show.
My best witness is Alexander Woollcott. For years he was a
theater critic, and carried his own feud with the Shubert brothers to
the Court of Appeals of New York. No one will suppose that Wooll-
cott would let a good instance of arbitrary expulsion escape his literary
acquisitiveness. But he had never heard of an expulsion, except for
58. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1g1).
59. How much protection would this give? (i) It is not brought to the actual con-
sciousness of most patrons. (2) It is in the nature of a release for future assaults, and
against public policy. But see Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law (i92I) 21 COL. L.
REv. 757, 777, reprinted in REAL COVEmANTS An OTER INTEPESTS WialcH "RUN
WITH LAN" (1929) 8, 43, n. 99.
PRIVILEGE OF FORCIBLY EJECTING AN AMUSEMENT PATRON 8ig
disorderliness. 0 He himself was never expelled, although he was re-
peatedly excluded at the entrance, and once sat through a show by vir-
tue of a writ of injunction, surrounded by private detectives and
observed by a crew of feature writers. Even the exclusions took place
only after he had been amply warned that he would not be admitted.
Woollcott persuaded me that I was searching for a missing link.
FuNcTioN OF THE DOCTRINE
* It might seem logical to conclude that the legal privilege of arbi-
trary expulsion of customers should be abolished.' There are visible
tendencies in that direction."' Yet none of the several lawyers, and
more numerous laymen whom I have consulted saw any merit in such
a change in the law. A typical layman's comment was made by a
woman who had no legal training whatever.
"I don't think a customer should get any damages," she said,
"because if there weren't something wrong with him he wouldn't be
put out." Obviously this answer begs the question by refusing to
admit that the plaintiff has been arbitrarily ejected. But it has practical
merit if there are no arbitrary ejections.
A similar thought underlies the answers of the lawyers, who
usually said that they didn't favor conferring a right to recover dam-
ages, because that would raise in every case a jury question of the rea-
sonableness of the expulsion. The jury might find arbitrariness where
none existed.62 Tacitly or expressly, they admit that an arbitrarily
and forcibly ejected patron should get damages. But no threat of
damages is necessary to make sure that the theaters will not be arbi-
-trary; potential loss of good will is penalty enough.
These judgments appear upon analysis to have two aspects. One
is distrust of the court's ability to determine correctly the good faith
or the reasonableness of the defendant and his agents. We state a law
which we do not like in order to prevent the giving of judgment by a
tribunal which we do not trust. This view of the matter helps explain
why Mr. Justice Holmes, usually solicitous of citizens' rights, was so
careless of the ejected theater patron. He profoundly distrusted the
jury. The rule that a proprietor might eject a patron was probably
one of the ."rules of law based on less than universal considerations"
which "are made absolute and universal in order to limit those over
6o. The expulsion of Shubert by Ziegfeld, above, occurred a few years before
Woollcott became a theater critic, and its particular circumstances were unknown to
him.
6i. (1) Cases which repudiate the prevailing dogma, cited notes 13, 14, 15, mtpra;
(2) cases allowing damages for uncivil language, cited notes 17, i9, Mspr.
62. Prof. Edwin W. Patterson calls this problem "the juridical risk," in The Ap-
portionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 335, 340.
82o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
refined speculations that we all deprecate." He observed, as an example
of this principle, "It is not thought worth while to let the right to build
or maintain a barn depend upon the speculations of a jury as to mo-
tives." 63
The other element in the opinion that the law should not be changed
is confidence that proprietors will act with decent caution, regardless
of legal sanctions. Such confidence, or lack of it, is likely to depend
on our social attitude toward proprietors in general. Such social atti-
tudes are said by some to have influenced development of the fellow
servant rule,0 4 and of the law of spring guns,65 while others vigorously
deny any such connection.6 6 It is notable that the spring-gun and fellow
servant cases are contemporaneous with the leading ticket cases, and
that the latter could be used to throw fuel on the fire which rages over
the former. It could be pointed out that the plaintiff who won the first
ticket case was an evidently estimable person who had made a twenty-
one year subscription to an opera box, and who held a silver token to
witness his rights, while the proprietors were apparently commercial
operators.67 But the defendant who won the second case was acting
on instructions of Lord Eglintoun, marshal of the races, while the
plaintiff was one who had been accused of drugging a horse. 68 I do
not attempt to assess the merits of this interpretation. But I note that
Mr. Justice Evatt, who would overrule the second ticket case,69 is the
same writer who sees evidence of class consciousness in the spring gun
and fellow servant cases. 70  Mr. Chief Justice Latham, who opposed
him, warned that the principle of Hurst's case would justify the sit-
'down strike.71
There is another factor in the belief that landowners do not need
legal sanctions, which is wholly independent of any particular faith in
landowners.72  This is the belief that economic pressure coerces the
proprietors to be fair more effectively than legal sanctions ever can.
Almost all the theater lawyers, and many of the laymen to whom I
spoke, shared this opinion. In the case of the exclusion of a critic,
63. Holmes, J., partially concurring, in Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 232 U. S. 340, 353 (1914). (Italics supplied.)
64. Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. I, I5o Eng. Rep. R. 1O3O (Ex. 1837).
65. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 13o Eng. Rep. R. 911 (C. P. 1828); Ilott v.
Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304, io6 Eng. Rep. R. 674 (K. B. 182o).
66. See Pound, The Ecowmic Interpretation and the Law of Torts (1940) 53
HARV. L. REV. 365; Evatt, The fudges and the Teachers of Public Law (194o) 53
HARv. L. REv. 1145, 1148-52.
67. Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374, 129 Eng. Rep. R. 15o (C. P. 1816).
68. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 351 (Ex. 1845).
69. Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse, 56 C. L. R. 6o5, 64o (Australia, 1937) (dis-
senting opinion).
70. Notes 64, 65, supra.
71. Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse, 56 C. L. R. 6o5, 621 (Australia, 1937).
72. See Note (1941) 40 MIcH. L. Rav. 324, 326.
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the superiority of economic over legal forces has been demonstrated.
Let Woollcott tell the story:
"As the first gestures failed to induce the Times to send an-
other reviewer to their shows, they [the Shuberts] tried out the
system of barring me from the theater. . .Within ten minutes
the Times had excluded all Shubert advertising from its columns
and also all allusion to any actor playing in a Shubert theater.
Next it instituted in my name an application for permanent in-
junction. . . . There were thus two entirely separate weapons
brought to bear.
"In the case of the legal weapon, we lost. . . .There was
some faint-hearted talk of agitation for ... a statute but at the
time I saw no point in it. If a newspaper is pusillanimous the
statute would not do its readers any good. If a newspaper is inde-
pendent in spirit it needs no such statute. This was demonstrated
in my own case because, having won the decision in the courts, the
Shuberts were no better off than before. Their plays, their players
and their advertising were ignored. Under this treatment they
soon came begging for my return and even ate crow iAi the form
of an open letter asking me to return." 73
It is probable that remedies for arbitrary expulsion of individuals
are similarly self-operating. This is not to deny that proprietors are
ever arbitrary; but their arbitrariness takes forms which are not affected
by the existence or non-existence of a privilege of expulsion. Usually
they bar an individual at the entrance, rather than disturb a larger
audience later. Accordingly Civil Rights laws wisely inhibit exclusion,
as well as expulsion, on racial or religious grounds.7 4  Even so, they
are often ineffective because jurors accept the manager's explanation
that it was on other grounds that the exclusion was made.75 Perhaps
an effective Civil Rights law must require the amusement enterprise,
like a public utility, to serve all comers. The California law has been
construed to apply to every applicant who is not disorderly; 71 the New
York law has been recently amended to require admittance of all who
are not disorderly, and who present tickets to stage productions.
77
There is another reason why the privilege of forcible expulsion
is not the crux of the problem. The ushers may proceed by ordering
a patron to leave, and obtain compliance without employing force at
all. The patron with female guests, who is most likely to suffer actual
73. From a letter sent by Woollcott, June 5, 1938.
74. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, i93o) c. 6, § 40, 4I; ILL. Ray. STAT. (Cahill and
Jones, 1933) c. 38, §§ 550-555.
75. According to an attorney representing the Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.
76. Greeneberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (903).
77. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Cum. Supp. Ig4i) c. 7, § 40-b.
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annoyance and humiliation, commonly complies with this request.
78
He has suffered the same type of damage as an abused- hotel or railway
patron but has sustained no assault at all.
I conclude that the proprietor's privilege of arbitrary expulsion
serves a somewhat useful purpose, for the strange reason that practically
no arbitrary expulsions occur. It protects a proprietor from liability to
a patron whom he has expelled with a reasonable, or at least an honest,
belief that he constituted a present threat to order in the theater, by
giving the jury no chance to find erroneously that the manager was arbi-
trary. This is not the ground on which the rule has been previously
defended as socially useful. For example it has been suggested by
Professor Warren that it is useful because the patron should be dis-
couraged from disturbing the theater by offering physical resistance
to his ejection.79  He evidently assumes that angry patrons would
know what the law is, and would resist an usher only if they could
recover damages for his use of force. But it is obvious that patrons
don't and won't know the law; I have found even lawyers rather hazy
on it. As to the unusual patron, who, like Woollcott, has decided to
make a test of his power, he will hardly miss the opportunity of making
the usher go to a maximum of trouble in getting rid of him. The sug-
gestion that the rule of law would influence the patron to avoid resist-
ance is one which I have never heard from a practicing lawyer. 0
The justification which I have proposed for the privilege of ex-
pulsion can be objected to only if there are in fact cases of arbitrary
forcible expulsion. This is a question of fact, on which my best infor-
mation is that they do not exist.
If arbitrary ejections actually occur, the problem which presents
itself is a very different one. Patrons and proprietors alike agree that
such conduct, if it exists, should be discouraged. Proprietors, unlike
patrons, are quite susceptible to being affected in their behavior by
rules of law, since they constantly retain counsel to advise their pro-
cedures. There appears no reason why liability to a damage action
would not increase proprietors' care to avoid arbitrary acts.
Various objections which suggest themselves must be disposed of.
The suggestion that proprietors do not need to be coerced begs the
'question; we are considering what the law should be if the non-legal
sanctions are not working. The suggestion that jury verdicts would
fall alike on the just and on the unjust is more serious; but it is equally
78. No actual assault appears in several cases where the plaintiff recovered for in-
civility. See cases cited in notes 14, 17, 19, supra.
79. WARREN, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1938) 925.
8o. See Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 757, 777,
reprinted in REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND"
(1929) 8, 43.
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available to condemn the existing rule which makes a proprietor liable
for use of excessive force. In both cases, judges should be enabled to
exercise a greater control over the jury. It will be suggested further
that a proprietor would have no choice, since he is liable to other cus-
tomers for failure to remove evidently boisterous persons,," and he
would now become liable to any whom he removed, erroneously believ-
ing him to be boisterous.
This argument is like that made for the proprietor in the early
spring gun case; 82 the proprietor, if liable, would have to choose be-
tween losing some produce, or paying damages to injured trespassers.
The law decided to present him with this unpleasant alternative. 83
The difficulty can be mitigated by avoiding the general tort rule, which
confers a privilege only if the proprietor's mistake is induced by the
subject's own fault, 4 and conferring the privilege wherever the mis-
take is one which a reasonable man would have made.
CONCLUSIONS
Amusement proprietors do not arbitrarily eject their patrons.
They do refuse admittance more or less arbitrarily. Occasionally they
eject patrons whom they believe to be disorderly or to have violated
the rules of admittance. In such cases their belief is honest, but not
always reasonable. If a proprietor should eject a patron whom he did
not believe to be violating established rules of admittance or of conduct,
he would be considered unfair by his fellow-tradesmen as well as by the
public.
The law as commonly stated permits the proprietor to eject arbi-
trarily as well as for cause. But the privilege is illusory, because the
jury may find the proprietor liable for use of excessive force or inci-
vility. If the law were restated to forbid arbitrary or unreasonable ejec-
tions, the principal effects would be to give the jury an additional oppor-
tunity for holding proprietors liable who act reasonably or in good faith,
and to impede performance of the proprietor's duty to keep his prem-
"ises safe for others. Such a restatement would, however, comply more
nearly than does the usual dogma with prevailing concepts of justice.
8r. Savannah Theatres Co. v. Brown, 36 Ga. App. 352, 136 S. E. 478 (1927);
Daniels v. Firm Amusement Co., 158 MiSC. 251, 285 N. Y. Supp. 557 (Manhattan Mun.
Ct. 1935) ; Marek v. Southern Enterprises, 128 Tex. 377, 99 S. W. (2d) 594 (1936).
82. Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304, io6 Eng. Rep. R. 674 (K. B. i82o).
83. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 13o Eng. Rep. R. gii (C. P. 1828).
84. RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1934) § 78.
